HE CHURCH has had a love-hate relationship with anthropology since the latter developed as a social science last century. This is understandable. Anthropology had its origins in an atmosphere of Comtism, utilitarianism, agnostic biblical criticism, and the beginnings of comparative religion, an atmosphere which in no way was favorable to religion. Its immediate founders, e.g., Edward Tylor (1832-1917) and James Frazer (1854-1941), were firm believers in social evolution; religion was part of the evolutionary process and it would eventually die away. For both Tylor and Frazer, religion was but an illusion, its place to be taken finally by the all-seeing authority of science. Even today, certainly in Britain, the conclusion of the anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard in 1959, then professor of anthropology at Oxford, remains true: the "majority of anthropologists are indifferent, if not hostile, to religion-atheists, agnostics, or just nothing-and a minority are Christians. 
cially for those who are not used to the diversity of technical terms used by various anthropologists. To the uninitiated, the terms and jargon can at times be almost overwhelming. To provide some clarifications for interested theologians, I will therefore in this article aim at (1) providing a brief overview of key schools of thought in American and European anthropology, (2) explaining briefly contemporary insights into the nature of culture, and (3) summarizing the insights of three influential contemporary anthropologists.
ANTHROPOLOGY IN AMERICA AND BRITAIN
Determinism connotes a doctrine which claims that all objects or events of some kind are determined, that is to say, must be as they are and as they will be, because of some laws or forces which require their being so. Determinism is in fact the name of a whole category of theories which have the above features in common. In the 19th and early 20th centuries biological determinism was a highly popular belief among the leaders of the emerging anthropology discipline. It is precisely against this form of determinism that the American Franz Boas developed his theory of cultural determinism.
7 This is the theory that a cultural system, or way of life, exerts or is capable of exerting a determining influence upon other aspects of human behavior. Hereditary influence, which the biological determinists considered primary, is severely downgraded by cultural determinists. Boas, supported by key contemporary American anthropologists, e.g., Robert Lowie, Alfred Kroeber, and Ruth Benedict, avidly sought confirmation for his theory. Margaret Mead 8 helped provide precisely the field-work support that he so much required. She left for the then-little-known Polynesian islands of Samoa in the late 1920s, young, very ill-prepared for participant field-work observation, and convinced that biological determinism is the thesis to which her own belief in cultural determinism must be the antithesis. Blinded by her own presuppositions and with little skill in firsthand research, Mead concluded that "human nature is not rigid and unyielding." 9 Culture deter-mined the differences of people, not heredity. Her unproven view that the Samoan people have relative freedom from sexually inspired frustrations was eagerly incorporated into the scientific foundation of the "sexual revolution" which the American middle class was in the process of experiencing. 10 Supported by her conclusions, a group of anthropologists and educationalists emerged particularly within America. They tried, writes Mary Douglas, "to link the manifestation of cultural distinctiveness to some kind of human action, even if it was only a feedback between the weaning and bodily training of babies, their subsequent personality development and cultural forms. This self-explaining circle bridged the gap from babyhood to adult behaviour in one leap." 11 All in all, it was a very gloomy approach to the human ability to adapt.
British anthropology in the 1930s, particularly under the leadership of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), generated a new way of looking at culture. Functionalism is a theory founded on an organic analogy: society is a bounded, self-maintaining system that keeps its equilibrium despite the challenges of difficult environments. In order to provide for a society's survival, its various social processes must interact smoothly together to meet the system's needs. Each process, institution, and practice is seen as performing a function that meets a cultural need and thereby helps to maintain the society's structure or equilibrium. Social processes and institutions are understood in terms of their contribution to an ongoing social whole, not in terms of what people in the system believe they are doing. Thus social practices must be understood in terms of their present contribution to a society. The basic functionalist explanation begins by identifying a problematic activity, one which seen in isolation may appear to make little or no sense. Then this activity is positioned in a wider social context and shown to be meeting some social need. Identifying the function forms the explanation of the activity. According to this approach, for example, the fact that a village comes together for Mass to pray for good weather for the crops appears to make no sense, because damaging rain does come. But the coming together means that the people reaffirm their faith in the collectivity. Hence the Mass, while it does not prevent the rain, has the key function of promoting social solidarity, which then helps the village cope with the failure of the weather. So in this case the act of religion is useful; it is functionally valid. The more 10 12 Functional empiricists devoted themselves with considerable zeal and professionalism to in-depth studies of societies, particularly in Africa and in the South Pacific. Even allowing for the theoretical weaknesses of functionalism, the quality of their field work was indeed excellent; the field-work methods had been developed especially at the London School of Economics and Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Theoretically, however, functionalism has grave weaknesses. The failure to conceive a society as a dynamic and imperfect equilibrium unfortunately made it very difficult for functionalists to cope with cultures that "refused to return to perfect equilibrium" once social change had affected them. In addition, the ruthless support of positivism closed functionalists to the richness and power of religion in people's lives. The possibility that supernatural beings could exist would not even be considered. Functionalism was not to remain unchallenged for long. Alongside functionalism in effect a new approach was developing out of the increased stress upon field work, and it may be characterized as a shift from function to meaning. This shift and the attendant theoretical development are associated primarily with the brilliant works of EvansPritchard, who was to succeed Radcliffe-Brown as professor at Oxford. Evans-Pritchard, a convert to Catholicism, published his first major study in 1937. 13 His attack on functionalism in 1950 was aimed at drawing out the logical consequences of the theory. "In its extreme form," he wrote, "functional determinism leads to absolute relativism and makes nonsense not only of the history itself but of all thought." 14 Few would hold to functionalism today in its extreme form. Almost all contemporary anthropologists are cultural relativists to some degree or other; they are sceptical of the idea that there are universal "natural laws" from which a rational morality might be developed. However, functional empiricists are possibly much less extreme in their support of cultural relativity than some other anthropologists. recognize the important distinction between "patterns for behavior" and "patterns of behavior." First, culture has been used to refer to the "pattern of life within a community-the regularly recurring activities and material and social arrangements" that characterize a particular group of people. 19 In this sense, culture has been used to refer to the realm of observable phenomena, of things and events out there in the world. This is what Roger Keesing calls the sociocultural system approach to defining culture. It stresses the pattern of visible residence, resource exploitation, and so on, that characterizes a group of people. Secondly, culture is used to refer to the organized system of knowledge and belief whereby a people structure their experience and perceptions, formulate actions, and choose between options. Culture is here an ideational system. 20 Culture then refers to a system of shared ideas, rules, and meanings, symbols that underlie and are expressed in the ways that people live. It refers to what people learn, not what they do and make.
It is culture as an ideational system that is really the most critically important emphasis in contemporary anthropology. The task of the anthropologist-and it is frankly a most difficult one-is to decode a particular people's interlocking system of meanings or symbols. An anthropologist will spend months, even years, in field work with a small group of people in order to realize this aim. Even after so long a period, most anthropologists will depart still feeling there is yet more to learn about a people's code.
In culture as an ideational system, symbols are referred to. The emphasis on symbols has helped to advance anthropology academically as well as unite previously divided anthropologists. Hence Geertz's ideational definition of culture would have wide acceptance: culture is "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life." 21 In this sense, culture is something living, giving meaning, direction, and identity to people in ways that touch not just the intellect but especially the heart. This is why symbols are of critical importance; they embrace the total person. A symbol is any reality that by its very dynamism or power leads to (i.e., makes one think about, or imagine, or get into contact with or reach out to) another deeper (and often mysterious) reality through a sharing in the dynamism that the symbol itself offers (and not by merely verbal or additional explanations). So a symbol is not merely a sign, for signs only point to the signified. Symbols re-present the signified; they carry meaning in themselves, "which allows them to articulate the signified, rather than merely announcing it." 22 And the meanings that symbols carry are many, even at times contradictory. Take the photograph of my deceased mother on my desk. When I look at this photograph, my mother comes to me in a very real way; the photograph does not just announce her or remind me of her. No, in a very real way she is present to me. This makes me happy, since I recall what her love has meant for me over the years. But I am sad at the same time, because she is no longer physically present to me. Joy and sadness-contradictory meanings and experiences. Symbols form the very heart of a culture; a particular culture exists when a group of people share major symbols and their meanings in common. Because of the multiplicity and complexity of meanings within symbols, it is little wonder if it is so difficult for an anthropologist to break the symbols' code.
Earlier in this article I praised the approach of Paul VI in Evangelii nuntiandi from an anthropologist's point of view. Now we can understand why: he spoke of symbols and of the enormous challenge that faced the evangelizer, since the faith must come alive within the symbols of a people if it is to take root at depth. This is an extremely slow and complex process, since it is a question of culture change, of new meanings to old symbols, and even new symbols also. So when a theologian states glibly that theology needs to interact with culture and conveys the impression that it is as simple as buying groceries, it is little wonder if the anthropologist becomes suspicious about the intellectual and professional standing of such a theologian. The anthropologist would rather appreciate the sensitivity of Paul VI's warning: the interaction between theology and cultures "has to be done with the discernment, seriousness, respect and competence which the matter calls for
The question is undoubtedly a delicate one." 23 If theologians are to develop a love relationship with anthropology (and culture), they need to be prepared for hard work. 34 The rituals she has in mind are so often of the simplest kind, e.g., cleaning, tidying the house or the desk, placing things in some kind of order. In all social relationships, no matter how weak they appear to the observer, some kind of social order is to be found. It is ritual that establishes the social order, the distribution of rights and of power, social relations. Her style is very human, her analyses down to earth. She sees this approach as being a very necessary corrective to deterministic and impersonal implications of traditional anthropology. Commenting on this point, she writes: "The first source of our troubles as cultural anthropologists is that we have no adequate conception of the individual."
35 Her approach to the notion of religion is refreshing; religion, she argues, does not cease to exist with modernization. What is very dubious, she notes, "is the general nineteenth century presumption that modernity adversely affects religion by taking wonder and mystery out of the universe-as if religion depends more on the physical environment than on the quality of social relations." 36 Tribal people who have very primitive technology can be very modern indeed in their acceptance of secularization. As she sees it, religion then can take many forms; it expresses itself in such rituals as cleaning one's room or political rites that characterize even the most modern secularized state.
One of Douglas' publications is called Implicit Meanings. The title emphasizes well the importance of her contribution to our knowledge of culture. She writes that "The implicit is the necessary foundation of social intercourse." 37 Her major concern is with symbolism that is con- The more the social situation exerts pressure on persons involved in it, the more the social demand for conformity tends to be expressed by a demand for physical control."
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This necessarily becomes reflected in a society's symbolic system in general and in its ritual in particular. An analysis of Soviet ritual proves her insight. So great is the control over the body and dislike of most body processes that the first impression is of body symbolism being nonexistent in Russian ritual. But, as one specialist in Russian society notes, only body movement resulting from a loose control-wild or ecstatic movement, organic processes, trance, unconventional appearance-is excluded from ritual. Body movement which expresses very careful control and precise co-ordination in the movement of a number of human bodies, in contrast, is very specially valued and frequently presented for public display and involvement, e.g., the mass military parades, massed choirs, and mass gymnastic displays.
40
To understand change in rite, symbol, and myth, Douglas has developed a typology which allows her to examine social relations analytically in any social context. 41 The four models within the typology are related by her to differences in cosmologies, so that a comparative study of culture and belief is possible. In her formulation of the typology, Douglas uses two variables, "group" and "grid." The group is the experience of belonging to a social unit, the feeling that "I belong to this group of people and not that group of people." The grid is the rules, the tangible and intangible structures or systems that relate one person to others on an ego-centered basis. I will explain briefly each of the four types. mal. Rituals reflect these emphases. The cosmos is seen as unstructured and unmagical. Because group and grid are so weak, religion is even more personal and private than in the previous model. The major ethical challenge is that of self-justification: "What matters now is the actor's motive and intent, as in the Christian notion of sin and the modern legal distinction between manslaughter and murder." 44 This differs from the notion of sin and how it is removed in the "strong group and grid" culture. There the stress is on the automatic efficacy of the ritual itself to remove any danger coming from the transgression. The safeguarding of social solidarity is all-important. Hence symbolic rituals are felt to have magical efficacy, so that faults are automatically removed, quite independent of the actor's intent, and order is restored to social life. This brief summary cannot do justice to the complexity of Douglas' analysis. For her "Most symbolic behaviour must work through the human body
The human body is common to us all. Only our social condition varies. The symbols based on the human body are used to express different social experiences. We should therefore start with a principle for classifying the latter." 45 And that is precisely what she does. The typology that she constructs, like all models, highlights certain emphases. In reality, no particular culture will reflect the "perfect type."
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Processual Symbolic Analysis of Turner
The early anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep was the first to spot the processual pattern that characterizes rituals whereby individuals pass from one culturally defined state or status to another. In rites of passage from childhood to adulthood in tribal cultures, for example, he found that the first stage involves separation of the person being initiated from his or her previous ordinary state in life. This was followed by a stage of a separate extraordinary existence that he calls margin, which is marked by a stripping of the previous identity and a ritual in which all individual differences among the novices are removed. After a sufficient period and after the necessary ritual degradations are completed and the novices have learnt the values of adulthood, the period of statuslessness is ended and the third stage, aggregation, is begun. This is the period of reintegration and reincorporation of the individual back into the community or 44 James L. Peacock, Consciousness and Change: Symbolic Anthropology in Evolutionary Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975) 32.
45 Natural Symbols vii. 46 See clarifications of David Ostrander, "One-and Two-Dimensional Models of the Distribution of Beliefs," in Douglas, ed., Essays in the Sociology of Perception 14-30. group as a "new" person with the new identity of being an adult. 47 Victor Turner, formerly professor of anthropology and social thought at the University of Chicago, takes Van Gennep's analysis of the tripartite phases of change from one psychosocial state to another and further elaborates it in ways that bring new insights into the nature of change and the power of symbols. 48 His methods of analysis and his ritual theory were developed during his researches into African tribal societies and their ritual processes. He later broadened his approach to include the analysis of ritual forms in larger and more complex societies. His insights provide us with a rich source of analysis into contemporary needs of people whether in tribal or industrial cultures. 49 It is not easy to do justice to his thinking in so short a space.
In his analysis Turner uses the words "preliminal," "liminal," and "postliminal" to refer to the three stages that Van Gennep spotted. He then distinguishes two types of culture. First, there is societas, a type in which there is role differentiation, structure, segmentation, and a hierarchical system of institutionalized positions. Most people live most of their lives in cultures that come close to this model. The second type is called liminal, that is, a type of culture that is undifferentiated, homogeneous, in which individuals meet each other integrally, not as segmented into statuses and roles. In the liminal state people are "neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, ceremonial." 50 In the liminal state people are apt to experience a uniquely intense and friendly companionship that Turner calls communitas. He states that "it is in liminality that communitas emerges, if not as a spontaneous expression of sociability, at least in a cultural and normative form-stressing equality and comradeship as norms rather than generating spontaneous and existential communitas, though of course spontaneous communitas may and does arise to break with "ordinary" living (societas) by a special pregame meal. We dressed somewhat less formally than we would in societas. Once in the park ground, I found myself talking in a very friendly way with strangers who surrounded me. We used Christian names. These are people who could well have been high government officials or street cleaners. That did not matter. What did matter was that we were all together to enjoy a first-class football game. Throughout the game the referee was shouted at by spectators in ways which would never have been legally and socially permitted in societas, that is, once the game had stopped and the spectators had left the ground. Notice the symbols of an antistructure type: speaking easily with strangers and using first names without any formal introduction, acceptable abuse of the referee, the informal style of one's clothing, the lack of rank or status symbols. All such symbols break the "cake of custom" (societas). The experience is enriching because, while structure is a normal part of life, and in fact essential for survival, it is always in danger of overpowering people with formalism. From time to time we need to be reminded that structures exist to serve people, not dominate. We came away from the football game refreshed. In our excitement we had together touched the vital underlying humanity of life. The consequence was that we all felt the richer for the experience. This is what Turner means when he speaks of liminality being a "stage of reflection" or "speculation." Liminality provides space for spontaneity, creativity, for which societas has little time. Those who come through liminality/communitas enter once more into societas, but envigorated, more sensitive to what really matters in life. In his more recent writings Turner has changed the term "liminality" to "liminoid" when referring to the postindustrial world. Leisure he sees as an example of liminoid. That is leisure in the fully human sense: "leisure can be conceived of as a betwixt-and-between, a neither-thisnor-that between two spells of work or between occupational and familiar and civic activity." 54 Leisure is the time when people feel the urge and freedom to be poets, dreamers, sculptors, comedians, feel themselves not subject to the pressures and time demands of the workaday world. In leisure people have the space to come into contact with deep metaphysical realities, to ponder the mysteries of space, nature, the universe. Such reflection within the liminoid can result in even a subversive approach to the values and structures of societas from which one has temporarily removed oneself in leisure. The most recent dramatic example of an almost world-wide liminoid period of "subversion and creativity" is the Expressive Revolution of the mid-1960s to early 1970s. 55 Society for Turner, therefore, is "process rather than timeless entity." 56 It is created again and again out of the effort to overcome the dualistic tension between structure and communitas. Structure refers to differences between people, whatever constrains people's actions and holds them separated. Communitas refers to the essential and generic human bond without which no society can exist. So strongly powerful and critical is this ritual process that totalitarian regimes seek to control its subversive and creative force. 57 We have but to think of the publicly manipulated rituals of Nazi Germany and the ritual of Soviet political religion. In the latter case massive efforts are made to use the tripartite process to inculcate the norms and values of Marxism-Leninism. Even in the industrial democracies the mass-media machine recognizes the importance of controlling the ritual process. Hence the efforts to prepackage leisure time. Opportunities for people to have real leisure could lead to subversion of the consumer industry.
CONCLUSION
Vatican II committed the whole Church to listen to modern man and woman, in order to understand them and to help create a new kind of dialogue, "which would make it possible to bring the originality of the gospel message to the heart of today's mentalities." 58 In short, as John Paul II has said, the Church must give itself to the "long and courageous process of inculturation." 59 But there cannot be inculturation unless evangelizers "adopt resolutely an attitude of exchange and of comprehension, in order to understand the cultural identity of peoples, ethnic groups, and the various sectors of modern society." 60 The challenge to theologians is, therefore, how to comprehend culture and cultures, how to develop an attitude of exchange in evangelization. The temptation is to escape and for theologians to speak only with one another. Some grasp the challenge and use various forms of social or cultural analysis, 61 some emphasize theological praxis methods, 62 others the methods of liberation theology. The thrust of this article, however, is that a dialogue between theology and anthropology has yet to begin in depth. Anthropology specializes in the understanding of culture and cultures, especially today in uncovering the nature and power of cultural symbols that form the very heart of cultures and therefore of people's lives. In fact, contemporary theology will progress only to the degree that it seeks to comprehend culture. For this, theology needs the professional insights of anthropologists.
For the nonspecialist, anthropology can at first appear confusing. Language is technical and authors do not always agree on terminology. In this article, therefore, I have tried to trace the agnostic and antireligion origins of anthropology. I have given a brief overview of some main schools of the discipline, then defined the term "culture" in a way that I believe would have fairly wide acceptance today among professional anthropologists.
Three anthropologists were selected for review because of their contemporary importance. One area they share in common is their interest in the nature and the power of symbols in the lives of people. We cannot begin to comprehend the nature of culture without grasping the reality and the force of symbols. Both Douglas and Turner happen to be committed Catholics. Both have criticized theologians and liturgists for what they claim to be insensitivity on their part to the insights of contemporary anthropology. Douglas complains that "there is a sad disjunction between the recognised needs of clergy, teachers, religious, writers and the needs of those they preach, teach and write for." 63 The cause of the disjunction, she asserts, comes from the fact that clergy and others have devised rituals and symbols of worship that suit themselves, but not the people they claim to serve. Turner argues that "one cause of the large-scale withdrawal of many Catholics from the institutional life of the Church who still think of themselves as Christians... is the comprehensive transformation of ritual forms under the influence of theoreticians drawn from the positivist and materialist camps " 64 In brief, he asserts that the theoreticians have fallen victim unwittingly to the fallacies of functionalism and its views on ritual and religion. These are strong words from two sympathetic anthropologists of world repute. Are they correct? Are there other criticisms of theological approaches and pastoral methods that anthropologists might like to make that should be listened to? The love relationship with anthropology needs to begin on the side of theologians. "At first glance," says John Paul II, "the challenge may seem beyond our ability, but is it not proportionate to our faith and our /lope?" 65 This is his response to the challenge of inculturation. The same comment applies to the challenge presented in this paper.
